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THEORETICAL AFFLICTIONS: POOR RICH WHITE
FOLKS PLAY THE BLUES
Lynne Segal
And suddenly out of this seething cauldron, two planes fly into what is
the most obvious symbol that any Hollywood producer could ever have
selected to symbolise global capitalism at work and play – the twin
towers of the World Trade Center. And we say, hands on our hearts, ‘we
don’t know where they came from. They seemed to come out of a clear
blue sky … ’
Stuart Hall1
At last, it has happened. The tiresome 1990s have come to a close. For
better, and certainly also for worse, something different is replacing the
most politically tedious decade in living memory. Hundreds of thousands
of demonstrators in the richer countries of the world take to the streets
once again, pursuing a variety political agendas, while a few academic
antagonists try to re-learn how to unite and face up to something beyond
their own world-weariness: to confront what Hall refers to as ‘the new reality
of the world as a whole’, one where ‘the spectacle of wealth on the one hand
and destitution on the other drives people crazy’.2 Decades are never simply
chronological, serving instead as powerful metaphors for their most salient
social, economic, political and moral challenges or, in these years, the lack
of them. John Major proved one of the most dispiriting prime ministers to
preside at Westminster, triggering neither admiration nor aggression, as
opponents waited patiently for our all too newly-baked Labour government
to be elected. Bill Clinton quickly became a bitter disappointment for many
Democrats who had so eagerly celebrated his election to the White House.
Indeed, with only the most meagre resistance, the Clinton years proved a
mere interregnum between the barely stalled Bush regency heading up the
militaristic, neo-liberal, predominantly Christian fundamentalist far Right
in control of the USA, stewarding ever deepening social inequalities within
its own population, while enforcing global trade agreements ensuring even
greater inequalities worldwide.3
MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA
The era of widespread trade union mobilisation and expanding social
movements during the 1970s gave way to increasingly sporadic  and
fragmented political struggles in the following decade. By the close of the
1980s, little seemed to remain but the insatiable profit-seeking force of global
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capitalism, following the pacification of class struggle, tireless ideological
assault on Keynesian social democracy and its belief in public planning, all
rendered emblematic with the final collapse of the USSR and its satellites.
‘The only new Worlds still to be discovered in the 1990s’, as historian Mark
Mazower suggests, ‘lay in the past’.4 In place of political ideals and collective
action, mourning and melancholia have never been more popular than
they became in the 1990s. ‘The past is simply selling better than the future’,
Andreas Huyssen argued, puzzling over the ways in which memory itself
had become ‘a cultural obsession of monumental proportions’.5
This was certainly the increasingly consolidated outlook of many Left
intellectuals facing the new millennium, backs resolutely turned on the
wreckage of their passions and pursuits of yesteryear. The ‘short’ twentieth
century (1914-1989), in Hobsbawm’s Olympian survey of the ‘Western’ world,
had moved with astonishing speed. The desolation and barbarism of two
World Wars, Hitler, the Holocaust and Stalinism in its first half was followed
by a Golden Age of rising hopes, accompanying the welfare and liberal
reforms that generated all manner of freedom movements across the world
in its second half, only to end with so many aspirations comprehensively
crushed at its close. Indeed, rising inequality, ethnic strife and military
manoeuvres brought back much of the threat and horror with which the
century had begun, as clashing fundamentalisms emerged alongside the
fiercest market-driven penetration of every pocket of time and space by
American-led, Western corporate capital, now uniquely hegemonic. Whether
surveying the remains of the Left, the fate of feminism, or providing other
narratives of decline in the 1990s, the main disputes concerned just how
terminal the mutilation of once cherished ideals would prove – from whatever
standpoint the aggrieved appraisal emanated. In evasive or defensive flight
from all that seemed lost, modish academic forums and critical reflection
increasingly retreated from political concerns to more personal issues of
‘identity’ and belonging, with the social conjured up, if at all, primarily in
the ethical or aesthetic domain.
From the Right, powerful backlash movements resisting the new sexual
freedoms, feminism and women’s economic independence (on the rise from
the 1960s) had been mourning immorality, divorce and ‘fatherlessness’ ,
now seen as the root of crime, educational failure, teenage pregnancy and
all manner of other social harms. True to the spirit of conservatism, of
course, there was nothing new here, except in the fact that women are
portrayed playing a more autonomous role as blameworthy agents, rather
than seen as mere foolish or contemptible victims. Prototypical warnings,
like those coming from US cultural pundit John Prodhoretz in 1996, could
have been issued at any time through the ages, proclaiming ‘the ominous
sense we all have that Americans are, with every intake of breath,
unconsciously inhaling a philosophy that stresses individual pleasure over
individual responsibility; that our capacity to be our best selves is weakening’.6
Looking back over the last thirty years, Melanie Heath and Judy Stacey
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note that wars over marriage and family life in the USA have now begun to
outlast even the most stable marriages. This both despite and also because
of the pro-marriage ideology dominating US public policy for over two
decades: ‘Indeed, the Clinton presidency performed crucial spadework for
the Bush administration’s full-scale effort to promote marriage rather than
welfare as a remedy for poverty’.7
Coming from the Left or coming from the Right, such sorrows need
their scapegoats, and errors and omissions are heaped upon one back or
another; accuser pointing accusingly at accuser, for starting the rot. The
somewhat misplaced crankiness of much of this political unravelling, at
least on the Left, gripped me again reading the essay I alighted upon when
preparing my thoughts on the 1990s, entitled ‘Resisting Left Melancholia’.
It was written by the engaging and erudite North American feminist theorist,
Wendy Brown, as one of the opening essays in the festschrift for Stuart Hall,
Without Guarantees. But far from resisting Left melancholia and the flight
from useful political engagement, as she hopes to do, her analysis is primarily
one castigating the mistaken attachments of others. Appropriately enough,
in a celebration of Hall’s work, she offers a firm defence of the cultural in
political analysis. I have no quarrel with that. But in this essay Brown deploys
psychoanalytic categories, supposedly via Walter Benjamin (who coined the
term ‘Left melancholia’, although it had little to do with any notions of the
Freudian unconscious) to analyse what she sees as the putatively ever more
pronounced and pernicious traditionalism of the contemporary Left.
The Left (presented here in singular mode, no hints of looser couplings)
is reproved for retaining a narcissistic and futile idealisation of an obsolete
vision of politics, via the projection of unconscious aggression onto ‘post-
structuralism’, ‘post-modernism’ and by their embrace of forms of ‘identity
politics’ and ‘cultural politics’. This essay is emblematic of my title,
‘theoretical afflictions’, in that it conspicuously utilises Benjamin to defend a
position remarkably similar to one his words were so passionately coined to
attack. In another recurring move, in my view it also misappropriates what
is most insightful in psychoanalytic accounts, within their own domain, for
more reductive and equivocal political ends.
I suspect that Brown, whose scholarly range unquestionably incorporates
the divergent connotation and context of Benjamin’s past political
attachments, in contrast to her own contemporary theoretical dilemmas,
carries on regardless not just because she understandably finds his metaphors
so very appealing, but because she has been dragged, probably unwillingly,
into the damaging and  impoverished political and cultural debates of the
1990s, known as the Culture Wars. On this terrain, all the weary old
antagonists are regrouped for further battle, strictly in the metatheoretical
domain: class struggle versus identity politics; scientific explanation versus
narrative or aesthetic understanding; material investigation versus semiotic
analysis.
Brown kicks off this particular action replay under an apparent
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Benjaminian flag, selected from his high Leninist phase, when he was busy
haranguing the poet Erich Kastner and his kind for their cultural
pretensions, for personifying an intellectual formation which has ‘little to
do with the labour movement’, which is ‘remote from the process of
production’ and does not function to build political parties. Representing
mere cliques and fashions, Benjamin derides such mourning and melancholy
as mere ‘tortured stupidity’: ‘Their beat very precisely follows the notes
according to which poor rich folk play the blues; they correspond to the
mournfulness of the satiated man who can no longer devote his money to
his stomach’.8 He wanted them instead to attend to the poetry of that
steadfastly single-minded cultural materialist Bertolt Brecht, for whom
socialism was simple, and had a great deal to do with the economy and the
sharing of material goods. Certainly, it may well be that it is not really so
peculiar that Benjamin in 1931 should himself be applauding all that Brown
now uses him to attack (in her words, the Left is guilty of ‘an insistence on a
materialism that refuses the importance of the subject and the subjective,
the question of style, the problem of language’), and to scorn much that
Brown herself might be seen to represent (in his words ‘the metamorphosis
of political struggle from a compulsory decision into an object of pleasure,
from a means of production into an article of consumption’).9 But, she might
at least acknowledge the irony of her own inversion of her framing text,
rather than, as she appears to, rely upon our ignorance of her source
material.
The psychoanalytic reading of disagreements and denunciations on the
Left is irritating for other reasons. There are simpler ways of explaining
Left sectarianism, particularly when its epicentre lies within the academy,
as in the contemporary Culture Wars. The generalisation of psychoanalytic
insights into the cultural and political domain is not intrinsically frivolous.
On the contrary, the social is psychically invested, with unconscious structures
of fantasy operating between groups of people as well as between individuals.
Confronted with the cruel intensities and uncontrolled rage often witnessed
in the horrors of ‘racial’ hatred (with their murderously, fear-laden
projections onto abjected others) or the tenacity of misogyny and irrational
fear of female power (held responsible for men’s lack of authority and
achievement, even when women as a group remain socially and culturally
firmly subordinate) we have compelling reasons to suspect that unconscious
structures are at work. However, it seems to me to reduce the seriousness of
psychoanalytic reflection, indeed itself to serve as an evasion of useful
analysis, when deployed to explain positions probably better seen as more
superficial ‘turf battles’, rivalry between peers competing for institutional
funding, academic prestige or media attention. Then it becomes more a
question of scholarly fashion – the search for stylishness, so deplored by
Benjamin.
Wendy Brown was herself drawn into the heart of this toxic terrain at
the close of the 1990s, sponsoring a workshop on ‘Left Conservatism’ at the
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University of California (Santa Cruz) in 1998, advertised in a flyer with the
clichéd formulation: ‘A spectre is haunting US intellectual life: the spectre
of Left Conservatism’. This was part of the fall-out of the hoaxing of the
cultural studies journal, Social Text, by Alan Sokal, a New York scientist,
aiming to defend the ‘real’ Left, engaged with ‘real’ issues, against a new
elite of pseudo-leftist academics, most prominent in Cultural Studies. In
fact, as a tenured physicist, Sokal’s actual rivals for the academic prestige
and funding he might once have enjoyed  comes not from Cultural Studies
(the National Endowment for the Humanities in the US gives a mere $150
million to universities) but from the new Gods of Science, molecular
biologists, who receive the public acclaim and the billions once reserved for
nuclear physics and weapons research (the National Institute of Health,
responsible for biomedical research, soared to $18 billion - an increase of
over 400 per cent in two decades).10 For very good reasons some scientists,
like many at the Harvard University Medical School, have themselves
questioned the extraordinary funds spent on the Human Genome Project,
with its largely pointless sequencing of the genetic make-up of human
chromosomes – 95 per cent of which are known as ‘junk material’ with no
behavioural outcomes.11 But media attention, like that of the populist
academic journal Lingua Franca (sponsoring Sokal), had a different, more
populist agenda.
WARS IN THE ACADEMY
The 1980s and 1990s had already turned out to be particularly embattled
decades in the realm of higher education. These were the decades, of course,
when women, ethnic minorities and other cultural dissenters, hitherto either
marginalised or themselves the object of interrogation in the production of
knowledge, began to join the interrogators in the wake of the new social
movements of the previous decades. Their whole raison d’etre was to challenge
traditional canons, to insist upon their own distinctive cultural and research
agendas, beyond the contours of existing disciplines. In the beginning,
therefore, conflicts emerged between those defending traditional
perspectives and the new recruits eager for change, but they soon widened.
Exemplary of the process, the multifaceted analytic, personal and political
agenda constituting Women’s and Gender Studies fed disputes within and
beyond its borders. As their influence waxed and waned, gender theorists
inspired new cutting edge erudition by the 1990s, promoting the self-
fashioning of putative sexual outlaws (whether diversely dissident or merely
‘queer’ in a Sedgwickian sort of way) rendering woman’s bodies, as Lorna
Sage commented, ‘less a secret garden than a public thoroughfare scrawled
over with slogans’.12 Some queer theorists for a while held at bay the gloom
of other progressive radicals, gleefully displacing binaries to dislodge what
they interpreted as the hopes of their ludic feminist champion, Judith Butler,
making gender trouble to undermine the melancholic charade of the
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‘heterosexual matrix’. But as the Culture Wars diversified disputes over the
significance and impact of feminist and queer scholarship were soon joined
by broader attacks upon and within the academy.
In addition to attacking the new radicals for undermining the prestige
and privileges of traditional domestic arrangements, conservative scholars
and media voices were busy denouncing them as well for encouraging the
‘dependency’ cultures of welfare and offering false dreams of general equality
and prosperity. But antagonism was strengthening between different
dissident groups themselves, weakening their resistance to such attacks.
Surprisingly, so it might seem, just when massive public spending and
promotion was accruing to many areas of science, its leading advocates used
their platforms in the 1990s to mourn the fact that we live in a culture
where science is not treated with respect. They saw it diminished and distorted
by the fashionable literary and cultural elite now presiding in the academy.
C.P. Snow’s lament from 1959, criticising the literary disdain for ‘the men
with the future in their bones’ resurfaced ever more publicly throughout
the 1990s.13 Assaulting the current academic situation, Paul Gross and
Norman Leavitt published Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its
Quarrels with Science in 1994, accompanied by much public fanfare. They
argued that the relativism of social constructionism and fashionable post-
modernism, combined with the rise of cultural studies and the attacks of
feminist, anti-racist and environmentalist critics, had undermined the
authority of science in the universities. 14 In agreement, the New York
Academy of Sciences hosted a conference the following year, ‘The Flight
from Science and Reason’. That same year, the illustrious North American
space scientist, Carl Sagan, writing just before his death, saw the flame of
science waning, spluttering like ‘a Candle in the Dark’ in a ‘Demon-Haunted
World’.15
This was the year when the Left-leaning American physicist, Alan Sokal,
as we’ve seen, fed the public chorus of disapproval of many intellectuals
with his hoax, designed to mock the questioning of empiricism and truth
by cultural theorists, in their defence of cultural relativities.16 Sokal’s blast
was assisted and promoted by some feminist scholars, annoyed by the
glamour surrounding some feminist theorists inside the academy compared
with the neglect accorded others supporting women’s struggles outside it.
The following year, this overheated account of the dangerous impact of
poststructuralism, deconstruction and postmodernism, undermining the
social sciences with ‘fashionable nonsense and word games’ had spread well
beyond the US as Sokal joined forces with the French physicist Jean Bricmont
to publish Intellectual Impostures (1997).17 Two of Britain’s best-known
scientists, Lewis Wolpert and Richard Dawkins, pursued similar battles here:
the former to protect the universal precepts of science from the follies of
other discourses, ‘there being only one correct explanation for any observed
phenomenon’; the latter (inverting the lament of Auden when finding
himself in the company of scientists) to declare he is made to ‘feel like
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shabby curates among literary dukes’.18
Academics with access to the media often seemed eager to join in
hostilities as fifth columnists, attacking their own side. The philosophical
ironist, Richard Rorty, began the decade lashing out at his specialist team
in the New York Times, ‘philosophy, as traditionally conceived, is an empty
and obsolete game that might as well be called off ’.19 By the close of the
decade, feminist philosopher Martha Nussbaum had accepted a platform
in the conservative US journal, the New Republic, to denounce the theoretical
obscurity and ‘hip defeatism’ of fellow feminist philosopher, Judith Butler,
in defence of the common sense empiricism of those attending to ‘real
women’ in ‘real struggles’.20 Some academics lamented the rise of a strictly
professionalised intellectual managerial class,21 others berated its opposite,
the corruption of higher education by ‘tenured radicals’  moving the
teachings of the barricades into the universities.22 Like the Canadian
historian Michael Ignatieff, several more comprehensively deplored ‘the
death of the intellectual’ as creating a void in public life.23 The one theme
uniting the sundry critics of academia was the narrative of intellectual
decline. The guns are still firing today, a recent contribution from New
York judge and legal academic, Richard Posner, accusing intellectuals (as
usual,  excluding himself) of providing ill-informed and irrelevant
commentary, from over-specialised academic domains.24
POLITICS OF CULTURE, CULTURE OF POLITICS
Entering such academic warfare, whether weighed down with the theoretical
abstractions of critical theory or buoyed up with the axiomatic certainties of
empiricism, has hardly brought out the best in any of its participants. Richer
understanding of culture, politics or, indeed, the nature of any form of
knowledge, is poorly served by any analytic framework that poses one
configuration against another – given the intricate entanglement of them
all. The imbroglio itself underlines the lassitude of the decade, as intellectuals
engaged in vicious assaults upon each other, and academic work – along
with much else in the public domain not wholly accountable to commercial
markets – became the butt of populist and government attack. The first
thing to note about the various stand-offs throughout the 1990s is the
political futility of championing any one side in the Culture Wars against
the other. On the one hand, economic realities and the shifting fortunes of
vulnerable people are everywhere enmeshed within signifying practices,
that is, within cultural understandings that legitimise the hierarchies,
inclusions and exclusions they reflect and inscribe. On the other hand,
organised political struggle, of whatever sort, always invokes collective
identities and interests, whether challenging exploitative economic practices,
legal discriminations or the oppressive symbolic processes implanting and
maintaining cultural marginalisation, disparagement, restraint and
exclusion.
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Outside academia, the 1990s had begun with the Left already starkly
polarised. In Britain this followed a sustained assault on its outmoded
practices throughout the 1980s launched by the magazine of the British
Communist Party, Marxism Today. The journal had portrayed ‘the Left’ as
hopelessly out of date, whether situated in the labour movement, Labour
Party or organised Left groups (although apparently excluding itself from
the critique). Marxism Today drew upon the writings of Laclau and Mouffe,
with their ‘modernized’ reconstruction of Gramsci, to berate the Left for a
politics that continued to prioritise the ontological centrality of class. In
contrast, Laclau and Mouffe refused to give centrality to any particular site
of struggle, seeing all oppositional groups as irreducibly unstable and plural
in nature, necessitating the most complex negotiations of equivalence
through the recognition of difference.25 Yet, while apparently now
sympathetic to the theoretical analysis coming from feminism and other
autonomous struggles, the non-aligned Left were never prominent in the
pages of Marxism Today. As its leading light Stuart Hall would later reflect,
this was because ‘with a few exceptions [the magazine] didn’t then take the
social movements very seriously’.26 Marxism Today’s legacy remained as
powerfully influential as it was contentious well after its demise, in the early
1990s. Its relentless rebuking of the Left in support of the affirmation of
fluid and multiplying identities and differences aligned it, unsurprisingly,
with the dominant notions of Cultural Studies and deconstruction. Its critics
saw it as contributing to the further demoralisation of a Left, already at the
weakest it had been for many decades. Some, myself included, found it
galling that sections of the ‘old’ Left should apparently finally fully embrace
ideas of the equivalence of all oppositional formations, precisely when the
new social movements had become organisationally weak, their impact
dwindling and dispersed.27
However, even for those who knew they wanted to avoid the polarisations
of the Culture Wars, as well as the sectarian struggles waged between many
Left groups, it was becoming harder to avoid confusion and uncertainty
over the relation between culture and politics. The theoretical ambitions of
a now institutionalised Cultural Studies, still hoping to be cutting edge,
bumped up against the strategic challenges of cultural disillusion in the
possibility of any overall political improvement. Raymond Williams (the
man who helped invent Cultural Studies) notoriously complained in 1979:
‘Culture …  the number of times I’ve wished that I had never heard of the
damned word’.28 With every leap of theoretical sophistication, the cunning
allure of the ‘cultural’, alongside a stylish evasion of the ‘economic’, when
analysing relations of power, set fresh snares for the politically attentive.
Having brought Derrida, deconstruction and subaltern studies to the
Anglophone world, the latter day diva of Cultural Studies, feminism and
postcolonialism, Gayatri Spivak, was expressing little more than despair
over their appropriations within these recently academically embedded
configurations. Defining ‘culture’ as ‘the word lent to a complex strategic
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situation in a particular society’, she now saw the use of her notion ‘strategic
essentialism’ to assert identity positions as primarily a shelter for the
profoundly individualistic, nationalist traditions of US culture: ‘It’s part of
radical chic, because the well-placed migrant community, the so-called
hyphenated Americans, the real culture-wallas, think that what’s happening
to them is basically what’s happening’.29 Criticising the failure to prioritise
institutional sites of cultural agency, Spivak was one of the first to call for a
‘transnational cultural studies’: an approach which could understand the
ways in which the reduction of politics to respect for the recognition of
cultural diversity and difference was now itself doing the work of promoting
US led, corporate capitalist interests in the new ‘financialisation’ of the world.
‘There is space for a reconstellation of the Marxist project here’, she added,
one which (in contrast to that of Laclau and Mouffe) analyses the neo-colonial
situation as one where systematic economic restructuring, international sub-
contracting and new forms of super-exploitation of women are thwarting
any hopes for justice under capitalism in an intensified North-South divide.30
In a somewhat similar vein, Edward Said pointed to the problems which
emerged when ‘French’ theory was transported from its European root,
propounded by academics originally confronting large Marxist movements
and far greater engagement with the state, to the very different context of
the USA, where scholars were far more detached from Marxist thought or
any involvement in state institutions. Furthermore, he argued, ‘the
marginalization, the ghettoization, the reification of the Arab, through
orientalism and other processes, cannot be answered by simple assertion of
ethnic particularity’.31 Even more trenchantly, Aijaz Ahmad insisted that
the promotion of multiple identitites in the ‘community of difference’ had
become a key strategy of the new global capitalist order, tied to a market
eager to service people’s avid need for signs of authenticity, on the one
hand, while working to dilute ‘the very grain of politics – which today’s
culturalism suppresses’ , on the other hand.32 The criticism these writers
were elaborating a decade ago is closer to the agenda now outlined in the
perspectives of many currently attempting to move beyond the deadlocked
polarities dominating debate in the 1990s. As more critical cultural theorists
were themselves eager to emphasise by the end of that decade, beginning
to theorise the cultural economy of globalisation (‘globalization is ordinary’),
the point to make is not simply that the cultural industries service global
economic exchange at every level, but also that an emphasis on ‘difference’
and ‘diversity’ is now promoted rather than suppressed in the international
arena of capitalism. But it is only certain ‘common differences’ that are
recognised, others are still determinedly suppressed. 33
There was then some ‘return to economics’ in Cultural Studies in the
late nineties, with a new emphasis on production alongside consumption,
on social context as well as hermeneutics, even a move ‘back to reality’. Yet,
some of the morbid symptoms of the decade remained.34 Whether in the
upmarket media, in educational or political forums, Cultural Studies had
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become the constant butt of derision – primarily because of rather than
despite its success – dismissed as intellectually frivolous, abstruse, an obstacle
to useful or uplifting knowledge and a waste of educational resources. The
crucial work it had fostered for several decades overcoming the historic
blindness to much of the terrain of gender, race and other forms of systemic
oppression within the cultures of modernity, its decisive role in opening up
possibilities for far richer communication between disciplines, was being
forgotten in a new form of contemporary amnesia.35
In another familiar, perverse move, some of the most fashionable cultural
theorists were themselves busy penning grandiloquent attacks upon each
other, rather than using their critical insights to reinvigorate richer cultural
and political agendas. With his unique brand of idiosyncratic provocation,
Slavoj Zizek combined a worship of Hitchcock and Hollywood, Marx and
Lacan, with fierce attacks on feminism, race and sexual politics:
So we are fighting our PC battles for the rights of ethnic minorities, of
gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so forth, while capitalism
pursues its triumphal march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of
‘cultural studies’, is performing the ultimate service for the unrestrained
development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological
effort to make its practices invisible … political struggle proper is
transformed into the cultural struggle for recognition of marginal
identitites and the tolerance of differences.36
On top of impishly insulting his own fans and collaborators for not
subordinating their more specific political agendas to class struggle, Zizek
offends more traditional activists by proudly cementing his ‘dogmatic
Lacanianism’ to a Hegelian critique of Marx, replacing any concrete strategic
role for class (or any other) struggle with the more enigmatic notion of its
role in the service of ‘absolute negativity’.37 Such metaphysical excess, one
can be sure, is hardly the soil that will renew any cultural or political agenda
beyond the lecture podium.
That the worst type of sumptuously but empty rhetorical abstraction,
posing as political analysis, remains alive in more than one of the doyens of
cultural studies can be seen in the recent spate of books on the 11 September
attacks, coming from Britain’s leading left publisher, Verso Books. As Peter
Osborne notes sharply, these texts display the worst forms of conflation of
levels of cultural and political analysis without any attempt to place their
interpretations within a plausible global history, thereby displacing ‘the
political burden from the content of their analyses onto their mode of
address: an enactment of conceptual opposition to each and every status
quo’.38 For Jean Baudrillard, deliberately trying to match the outrageousness
of the event with the outrageousness of his commentary, the event brought
out the terrorist in us all, while creating the impression that the twin towers
‘were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides
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… [as the West] has become suicidal, and declared war on itself ’.39 For Paul
Virilio, the world is now ‘united beyond good and evil by the inauthenticity
now shared by broadcasters in East and West’.40 For Zizek, the effect of the
attack was ‘to (re)introduce the dimension of absolute negativity into our
daily lives’.41 We learn nothing about the specificity of the current global
context, nor detect a glimmer of any forms of practical oppositional political
action from any of them. On the contrary, as from Zizek, we attract only the
spray of his contempt for ‘Leftist follies’, hailed by him as ‘the repellent
figure of the comfortable, well paid English or French radical Leftist’, already
identified with ‘the dirty obscene underside of Power’.42
Elsewhere, I have argued that it was once feminism, the bête noire of
these particular cultural theorists, which worked hardest to promote new
forms of radical cultural politics. But its radical spirit had also long since
waned by the 1990s. Here too a new breed of antinomian feminists were
able to launch themselves and court media attention via scathing attacks on
other feminists, or breathing fresh life into pedestrian celebrations of male
lust and female allure. One of the most successful in this arena was the
polemical cultural critic, Camille Paglia, who did – and does – perform
both roles with unflagging passion. An expedient feminist sensibility offering
banal self-help homily was now part of popular culture, alongside the
shallower meritocratic individualism of a type of bland ‘new feminism’,
exemplified in the combination of characteristic chastisement and confident
aspirational striving to be found in Natasha Walter. Walter eulogised young
women’s determined commitment to personal success, while blaming
feminism for failing to eliminate inequity in women’s lives (this time through
its inappropriate focus on ‘sexual politics and culture’), while herself evading
any serious analysis of the cultural and political forces which might be
keeping women subordinate.43 It is just such a feminism of individual growth,
devoid of critical edge, which has been selectively mainstreamed to service
neo-liberal values today. It is appropriated by a managerial elite, eager to
roll back welfare for workfare, holding every individual accountable for their
own fate, however systemic or collectively specific their privations, problems
or protests. It is also the adjustable women’s rights feminism invoked with
false piety as proof of Western post-colonial authority, recently most
egregiously displayed in George Bush’s sudden convers ion to it as
justification for military action in Afghanistan.44
Yet even as historical amnesia works here also to erase other legacies of
feminism, its more radical residue lingers for those who wish to find it.
MIDNIGHT SALVAGE
One certain thing about the academic and media battles over knowledge,
culture and politics waged throughout the nineties was that their casualties
were figural. Loose talk of the Real (or the hyperreal) did not cost lives. Its
critics are right to believe that its level of abstraction kept it detached from
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political engagement, where, as we saw above, some of its celebrity theorists
remain. However, the literal return of planned collective killing in the
metaphorical heart of the Western world on 11 September, ushering in (as
was clearly intended) massive US-led Western retaliation against targets in
the ‘Islamic’ world, has refocused the mind of many intellectuals on the
necessity for more immediate political responses to actual and planned
devastation. (Even though, dare one admit it, for all its merciless brutality,
the casualty list on that day in the USA was relatively small compared to the
collective slaughter we have witnessed constantly around the world over the
last decade, from ex-Yugoslavia to Chechnya or Rwanda.) Determined
attempts to encompass the totality of the current situation, nationally and
internationally, are flooding back. Despite the supposed ‘decline’ of nation
states, we quickly learn, the dangers we all face in this new epoch is one in
which a single nation state wields greater imperial power than has ever
been seen before in human history, with 11 September serving as a catalyst
for more aggressive control over any other even potentially refractory nation
state. Moreover, for the moment, it does so without an even putative effective
opposing force, in contrast with the global situation post-1945, when the
USA felt it must win the hearts and minds of other nations in order to
combat the growth of the extraordinarily centralised, if highly inefficient,
command economy of the ‘communist’ USSR.
As Francis Mulhern, among others, warns us, ‘politics is not coextensive
with culture, nor is their relationship stable over time’.45 All too true. Yet, it
is still cultural identifications and belongings that at times draw us into
progressive politics (whether as Marxists, mothers or members of trade
unions: and usually with as much or as little hope of successfully overturning
existing social relations). Just as it is such attachments which can be (as all
have been) manipulated to service reactionary, repressive, even the most
destructive ends. It is feminist, anti-racist or more specific sexual political
agendas, which can be manipulated to sideline and undermine more general
struggles for justice within global capitalism. However, far more often,
historically, forms of reactionary nationalism, heard today on platforms like
that of Pat Buchanan in the USA, are used with huge success to win the
support of working class men and women, via the most vicious onslaughts
on those from ‘alien’ cultures, feminists or sexual dissidents. In his historical
writing, four decades ago, Edward Thompson set out to narrate the ways in
which class has a cultural as well as an economic dimension, lived as forms
of experience and identity.46 Similarly, Alan Sinfield argues that political
identity does not derive directly ‘from class or gender or racial position, or
sexual orientation (or from any theory)’: ‘It derives’, he concludes, ‘mainly
from involvement in a milieu … the principal cultural effect, of looking at
a picture as much as going to a football match, is the development of group
allegiance; of perceived affiliations and breaks’.47 There is thus little wisdom
in posing the economic or political against the cultural, when each
conceptual level, though distinct, is also inseparable. This is, of course, why
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terms like ‘political economy’, ‘cultural politics’, ‘sexual politics’ were
introduced in the first place, to encompass the ways in which political
consciousness is constituted, consciously and unconsciously, through culture
and interpersonal relations.
The point is that conservative mobilisations, however framed, give us
no reason to disdain rallying for progressive political ends along the very
same lines of attachment. The tension that exists between culture and politics
need not mean (though it often has meant) that the one analytic frame
necessarily engulfs the other, as Stefan Collini argues criticising Mulhern’s
fear that cultural analysis of formations of power always threatens to displace
or dissolve any ‘fully political’ solution to them.48 In progressive contexts,
as women’s liberationists found back in the 1970s, political engagement
can not only motivate and empower its participants, but also work to
encourage the continuous development of solidarities against exploitative
and oppressive practices across the broadest of barriers. It does this,
obviously, in contexts that foster shared attachment to possible universal
visions of a more equal, united and peaceful world – whether driven by
struggles against corporate capitalism, ecological concerns or some more
spiritual humanitarianism. In Spaces of Hope, the radical Marxist geographer
David Harvey calls for a renewed optimism of the intellect. He insists, I
think correctly, that there is no necessity to polarise particularity against
universality, so long as we realise that all universal struggles have quite
particular origins and so long as we acknowledge that our universal
conceptions are never unchanging or absolute. Widespread political
resistance becomes possible whenever the choice to express political solidarity
is made visible and concrete, which will always rely upon some imaginative
conception of shared humanity. Despite all that we face in this current
ideological triumph of neo-liberalism, aspirations to think universally can
sustain attempts to remain active as subversive agents ‘with one foot planted
in some alternative camp’.49 Meanwhile, the mere ‘invocation of the concept
of “politics”’, as Collini again points out, ‘however sophisticated or radical,
is not itself politics’.50
Embracing universal ist aspirations also entails recognition of the
importance of personal attachments. Notwithstanding all the cautionary
and critical mantras of recent years on the contradictions, ambiguities and
instabilities with which any form of identity and belonging are riven, despite
knowing that identities which foster hopes for commitment and solidarity
also create rankings which silence or exclude others, we still have the very
best of reasons to recognise and support people’s relatively non-coerced,
relatively non-coercive identifications and attachments. For it is the volatility
and fragility of just such attachments in today’s world (one where most of
us, much of the time, must defer to the demands and upheavals of market
forces) that means we become ever more compulsively driven to consume
capitalism’s own flimsy authorisations of authenticity, its marketing of our
ever vanishing heritage. We certainly need to think more clearly about both
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culture and politics, in political cultures that increasingly encourage the
take-over of democratic control of national and local government, and all
they provide and regulate, by private capital. Nation states are not
disappearing, but they are becoming effectively less democratic, as trade
agreements allow the interests of global corporations based in the richer
nations to wipe out the economies of less developed countries (the
devastation of the banana market in the Caribbean in the 1990s providing
just one notorious instance).
As most of those currently hoping to find ways of political engagement
today are only too well aware, even trying to envisage ways of opposing
such predatory market rule will mean drawing upon the imagination and
mobilising skills of all possible oppositional and progressive forces, via
whatever forms of political pressure can be brought to bear on the seven
richest nation states (plus Russia), which make up the G8 countries
dominating the IMF and WTO. It was when thousands of people protested
against the World Trade Organisation in Seattle, at the close of 1999,
installing the anti-corporate capitalist globalisation movement in North
America, that greater efforts to regenerate oppositional movements have
kept beckoning. Similar actions would soon emerge in expanding numbers
across Europe and the UK, its most recent manifestation is the half million
marchers appearing on the streets of Florence to protest against US driven
militarism and iniquitous trade agreements and the imminent ‘war’ with
Iraq. As Baudrillard argued in his provocative, if little read, polemic ‘The
Gulf War never happened’, the US and its allies do not really wage war
nowadays, because the sides are far too uneven: it is more a matter of targeted
slaughter.51
Rethinking and refining all our conceptual tools and collective actions
has always been the imaginative challenge before us, when it is capitalism
itself that continually works to accommodate whatever forms of opposition
it confronts for its own ends. While political elites mouth post-feminist and
neo-liberal feminist rhetoric to further their goals, to take just one familiar
example, the spectre of a more politically authentic feminism lives on, always
threatening to expose the erasure of those earlier feminist struggles –
whether around the workplace, domesticity or access to democratically run,
shared community resources. The fact that people are mobilised to fight
for better lives though cultural identifications, on the one hand, needs to
be understood and kept separate from observing how capitalism attempts
to accommodate and contain such struggles, on the other. The salutary
lesson of the passing of the 1990s is that its intensified polarisations of
identity against class, culture against politics, crystallise problems that have
dogged political life for decades. They invoke dilemmas which should long
since have diminished, as we find ways to convey that on the conceptual
terrain the differing levels of political and cultural analysis, while needing
to be theorised autonomously, are at the very same time lived and acted
upon always together.
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Starting over again, while keeping hold of different ways of assessing
where we have come from just might, in the words of Adrienne Rich, produce
the ‘midnight salvage’ which keeps both passion and politics alive. Rich,
whose poetry is always rooted in feminist politics, who registers that
‘capitalism lost no time in re-arranging itself around “feminism”’, who sees
that ‘one period’s necessary strategies can mutate into the monsters of a
later time’ (calling for a moratorium on her own once favoured words, like
the ‘body’), who laments her earlier forms of blindness, yet so stubbornly,
still, preserves her oppositional imagination, knowing that it is necessary to
be ‘generous to earlier selves, [to] keep faith with the continuity of our
journeys’, and the lessons we have learned on ‘what moves other people to
change’: ‘A politicized life’, she writes, ‘ought to sharpen both the senses
and the memory’.52
I hear the same message today coming from some exemplary 1990s
feminists, as when listening to Butler recently seeking possibilities for an
‘international feminist coalition’ to think through and act upon the global
dilemmas women face. ‘Various routes lead us to politics’, she notes, ‘various
stories bring us onto the street, various kinds of reasoning and belief ’.53
Indeed. The philosophical tradition, which propels her global egalitarian,
pacifist stance (a politics I share), is not one that will win us all – male or
female. It begins, and ends, with the demands of cultural translation, in her
words: ‘I am nowhere without you. I cannot muster the “we” except by finding
the way in which I am tied to “you”, trying to translate, but finding my own
language must break up and yield in order to know you’. Sadly, many will
ignore Butler’s demanding art of translation, will not learn, as she sees it,
that ‘the human comes into being, again and again, as that which we have
yet to know’.54 But, she can move (as well as frustrate) me, as she does others
who project their best selves onto her intellectual aura. From the opposite
end of the same feminist spectrum, archetypal 1970s radical, Barbara
Ehrenreich, inspires me too. Briefly leaving word play to look after itself,
she takes on whatever menial job she can, then writes up her experiences
among America’s most exploited female workers with such fiery humour in
Nickel and Dimed that it became a best-seller in the US – she tells rich tales
of poor folk beating back the blues.55 Facing up to the very bleak opening of
the 21st century, means transforming mourning and self-serving rivalries
into a richer, more inclusive politics, which might still serve to ignite a wary,
if still far from winning, hope.
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